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Ballet and the Soviet Body
The site in the picture is the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow. The celebration is of May Day, and 
this picture was taken in 1947. Already by then, the pediment of the theatre had long lost its 
Tsarist double-headed eagle, replaced by the Soviet coat of arms created in 1923 and 
affixed to the theatre not long after.1  The huge portraits of the great figures of the revolution, 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, were erected for May Day celebrations and reused on the 
Bolshoi façade for many years, up to the end of the Soviet period. Stalin disappeared in the 
mid-fifties, but the others remained, staring out at the crowds in the square in front of the 
theatre. For the whole period of the Bolsheviks, and for many years afterwards when cranky 
crowds of unreconstructed communists continued the tradition, the once exclusive Bolshoi 
was the centre of the celebration of the Day of the Worker.
Ironies about this abound. The most striking is just how much Lenin, in particular, loathed the 
institution which would ultimately become the face of Soviet culture. His waspish replies to 
the Anatole Lunacharsky’s repeated pleas for further funding for the institution once the 
Revolution had taken it over include an encouragement for it to survive as a going concern. 
The leader of the Revolution of the Proletariat thought the best thing for the Bolshoi was 
surviving in the marketplace. Lunacharsky’s persistent support for the Bolshoi, as 
Commissar for Enlightenment, ultimately paid off. As vexed as Lenin was about its survival, 
more pressing threats to the revolution demanded his attention, and Lunacharsky got his 
way. It became the State Theatre, and its artistic staff proved sufficiently flexible to produce 
ballet for the working classes, informed as it was by Lunacharsky’s own middlebrow tastes.
1 This wasn’t removed until the renovation of the theatre between 2005-2011, outliving the regime 
itself by fifteen years or so.
The survival of the Bolshoi through the turbulent politics of the time is story enough, but 
there is a larger tale to be told about the way ballet more generally found its way into the 
body politic of the Soviet Union. This aspect of its endurance is often neglected because of a 
preoccupation with the politics around institution building in the Soviet Union (especially its 
early stages). There is no doubt that in all spheres of life the USSR invented and 
experimented with institutional structures that would prove suitable for the new society they 
were seeking to build, and many of these provide evidence for us about what those 
fundamental values were. To balance out this account, it is worth asking questions not just 
about the Bolshoi, but about how ballet became synonymous with the Soviet Union beyond 
the overt politics of culture. 
Inherent in this suggestion is a critique of foregrounding the politics and treating ballet as a 
symptom of it. In this essay, I will suggest it wathe subject ought to be tackled the other way 
around, and that ballet had a reasonable case to make as both a proletarian and Russian 
art, and that the founders of the Revolution and their successors were not simply pandering 
to the tastes of the new elite, nor seeking to protect or preserve a Tsarist legacy. 
Besmirched as it was by its association with the Romanovs, there was eventually found the 
means of rehabilitating ballet and giving it cultural prominence. This is hard to detect without 
setting aside a preference for politics over art, and it is this prejudice I hope to engage.
At least partly, the interpretation of ballet as a political form stems from received wisdom 
about practice as symptomatic of more profound thinking. This is a difficult case to sustain 
from the perspective of makers of culture, who are rarely inhibited by correlating creative 
decisions with intellectual aims, but it is the legacy of a lens through which ballet as action is 
invariably assessed. Mostly, these are phenomenological accounts that grant the body a 
voiceless presence secondary to the interpretation of culture rather than its manifestation. 
This follows, I would suggest, a general assumption about dance, that the disinterested 
examination of it renders up something far more revealing than the passions that produce it. 
This often happens without acknowledging the game being played out, about how a 
secondary enquiry trumps a primary practice. But this in itself is insufficient for creating the 
wildly uneven playing field that blights enquiry into dance as a cultural form. The more 
pressing issue is not whether this is correct, or the right method of understanding culture, but 
how it is we treat it as if it were so. Ballet provides us with an excellent example how these 
assumptions play out, with the bodies of ballet dancers apparently mere ciphers supporting 
an idea rather than manifesting an end in themselves. I would suggest the enthusiasm for 
the quasi-science of mirror neurons is simply another way of casting the mould.2 Such 
accounts invariably vacillate between the voyeuristic and the vicarious and leave out the 
physical given its remoteness from the experience of most spectators. The more radical 
argument I would like to make is certainly related to the politics of the Soviet Union, but of 
the kind that sees a connection between the sophisticated technique required of ballet 
dancers and the search of a society for the means of creating meritocracy through human 
capital ideologically consistent with the avoidance of unearned privilege. It turns out to be no 
surprise that Soviet ballet was distinguished as the tough, muscular work it became. It is the 
reasons for this that might be in dispute. 
Two Lives
In short, the example of ballet in Soviet times can demonstrate to us the alternatives to our 
cultural assumptions and the problems we have in the West in extending and expanding the 
interest in high culture forms. As I hope to explain, the technical capacity to do contains 
2 I have yet to see even the most battle-weary untrained balletomane replicate a step, though there is 
plenty of enthusiasm for the conceptual possibility that this is what fascinates us when we watch.
within it a threat to the dominance of cultural capital and its ability to validate that technical 
capacity as high culture. This is a very critical piece of information in relation to ballet and the 
Soviet Union, and my argument about why ballet might possess attractive properties for a 
society strongly engaged in the rapid acquisition of technical and scientific processes as its 
national project draws on this possibility. It also contains a wider application that seeks to 
rebalance the relationship between artist and practice and artist and context. I will return to 
this proposition later, but would begin with two exemplars of contrasting lives prior to the 
Revolution that can help explain how ballet came to stand for the Soviet Body.
The first is Mathilde Kschessinskaya (1872-1971). She was the scantily-clad mistress to two 
Grand Dukes as well as Nicholas II, the possessor of a lifelong love of fine jewels and a 
notion about feminine beauty and how that worked on powerful men in technical terms. From 
a ballet dynasty, she first caught the attention of Alexander III, and made the most of her 
connections with the House of Romanov until her death in 1971.
  
Photographs from her career in the Imperial Theatres in St. Petersburg show her in 
provocative poses, offering her breasts and legs, with an intuitive sense of how these formed 
her identity and indeed gave her power over influential men. Such was the allure she 
possessed that the last Tsar, Nicholas II, had a villa gifted to her, and the apocryphal stories 
of a secret tunnel linking it to the Winter Palace were impossible to lay to rest. 
The second example is Lenin (1870-1924) himself. He was possessed of the same 
bourgeois taste of his education and class, his father having been principal of a well-known 
school in Simbirsk (where the leader of the Provisional Government that Lenin would 
depose, Alexander Kerensky, was a pupil) and a junior member of  the table of ranks that 
constituted the lower end of the Russian aristocracy. He was fond of classical music, 
literature and film, all bookish, sedentary pursuits. He hated ballet, and took active steps to 
close the Imperial Theatres, thinking it a superfluous distraction and antediluvian in 
Bolshevik Russia. Apart from some occasional cycling, he rarely engaged in exercise. 
The two pictures themselves demonstrate the contrast between two ways of being; the 
sensual life of the physical and beautiful that gave Kschessinskaya meaning, and the 
intensity of the intellectual and political pursuits that absorbed Lenin. Having noted this 
contrast and the difficulty of reconciling these world views, it is worth noting that the second 
picture, Lenin reading a newspaper in his study, was taken in Kschessinskaya’s house.
The villa that Nicholas II had given Kschessinskaya was handily located for the institutions of 
power in St. Petersburg, and so was occupied by the Bolsheviks as a convenient landing 
stage for nearby Admiralty Square. They simply arrived one day and demanded access. 
Kschessinskaya herself was shocked at the appropriation of her property, and eventually 
(after rescuing as many jewels and furs as she could) fled to France, eventually to Paris. 
Lenin, for his part, worked from her parlour in her absence, gave speeches from her balcony 
and to this day the house is preserved as a political museum.3 
Kschessinskaya and Lenin were near contemporaries, and their relative fates and impact on 
their times are matters of history. Neither of their fates turned out the way they might have 
planned them, or could possibly have been foreseen just a few years earlier, but the 
intersection of their lives through Nicholas II’s generosity were important for ballet and for the 
identity of the Revolution. If Lenin was convinced of the triviality of ballet, occupying 
3 Lenin’s biographers often cite his brother’s execution by the Tsarist government in 1886 as the 
pivotal moment of his conversion to the cause of revolution, and it is hard not to suggest a moment of 
satisfying familial triumph of the Ulyanovs over the Romanovs.  He couldn’t possibly have reconciled 
a royal residence, but the home of the mistress to the Romanovs might have been other story. It 
should be noted that Kschessinskaya’s salon has been restored since the collapse of the USSR, but 
Lenin’s study arrangements remain.
Kschessinskaya’s house ought to have made him ponder about its power but his was an 
intellectual life, not a corporeal one.
The Russian Ballet
It is worth remembering that at the time of the Revolution all ballet, wherever it was 
performed, was referred to as Russian Ballet. The migration of court dancing in Versailles to 
the Francophile Russians across the nineteenth century left them as the custodians of its 
form, and they spent much of the second half of that century innovating and improving the 
notion of dance as a spectacle. At the time of the Revolution, the Ballets Russes had been 
touring Europe for fifteen years. It had been established from dancers provided by the 
Imperial Theatres in St. Petersburg and their repertoire (though the Ballets Russes extended 
this significantly, especially through the work of Michel Fokine). The chaos of the Revolution 
decimated the Marijinsky Theatre, with droves of dancers seeking sanctuary in the West, 
either with Diaghilev or the other minor troupes that sprung up from time to time. This left 
ballet in Russia itself in crisis.
Russian Ballet, whilst presented in St. Petersburg as the refinement of elegant Francophile 
physicality, was adored by Paris as the outpourings of the exotic East. Its most popular 
offerings were ballets like Scheherazade (1910) or Petrushka (1911), rather than the three 
act classics of the Marijinsky’s repertoire.4 As a result of the departure of Petrograd-based 
dancers to Diaghilev, the Bolshoi in Moscow (still administered as part of the same 
organisation as the Marijinsky), acquired more prominence as the showcase for Russian 
Ballet. This shift of power was accompanied by the eventual movement of the capital back to 
its ancient home in Muscovy. There was a new government to satisfy if it were to maintain 
any presence at all.
We know the Bolsheviks saw culture as a potent weapon in their plans to change the world, 
and should remind ourselves of their original assumption that revolution in Russia would 
naturally lead to revolution elsewhere (especially Germany). As a result, their mobilisation of 
all parts of society in the cause of a workers’ revolution included preserving and exploiting 
the arts. Anatole Lunarcharsky (1875-1933) may well have saved the arts from his more 
revolutionary minded colleagues but, as Fitzpatrick (1992) has pointed out, he did not do so 
on aesthetic grounds. Rather there were political considerations about the association of the 
Bolsheviks with quality cultural experiences that were often intentionally radical and 
transformative, like constructivist architecture and design, or films valorising the 
achievements of the masses in achieving societal change, like Eisenstein’s films Strike 
(1925) or October (1927). The transition was comparatively easy for the Bolshoi Opera, in 
reviving work banned under the Tsar (The Decembrists) or commissioning work that 
focussed on vast, sweeping choruses that utilised mass movement and singing (an operatic 
version of Battleship Potemkin was staged). The issue was about how ballet might fit into 
this picture of uncompromising newness. What would ballet for the Bolshveiks look like? 
There were plenty of dancers who wanted the ballet to reform and take part in the exciting 
new polity that was emerging, and plenty of others who felt that ballet was a comfort to those 
discombobulated by the social and political ructions around them.  Going to the ballet proved 
stubbornly popular, (indeed a huge black market for tickets grew up) but still needed to 
contribute to the new polity on which it now depended for survival. 
I have discussed elsewhere the travails of ballet in Soviet Russia during the 1920s (see 
Sporton, 2012 for more detail), but essentially the efforts of the Bolshoi in particular 
remained focussed on the political content of the narratives of new work. It is worth repeating 
at this point that no one knew exactly how the Revolution would play out in terms of the 
4 Indeed, the 1924 production of Sleeping Beauty almost sank the company completely as there was 
no audience in the West for such placid stuff.
international changes that were expected to flow from the events in Russia, and even during 
the Civil War that followed, it was clear some powerful forces had been unleashed.  
Throughout the twenties, in all art forms, there were vigorous attempts to reinvent content in 
a guise consistent with the aims of the Bolsheviks, especially as they concluded the Civil 
War and took a grasp on the nation.  As we know, this doomed many of those involved in 
these experiments as the Great Terror took hold a decade later, but the radical faction at the 
Bolshoi, led by the choreographer Goliezovsky, took their responsibilities to the Revolution 
seriously.  They mounted a number of failed ballets that attempted to subvert the traditions 
of ballet and reinvent them as socialist representations.  The Footballer,(1930) had just a 
handful of performances, and it seems striking in contrast to the Swan Lake productions that 
preceded it.  Gone are restrictive costumes and princely behaviour: the heroes of this 
scenario were honest workers, trying to outwit NEPmen and the black market, dressed in 
stage versions of modern dress.  Other ballets during this period might have large sums 
spent on production and rehearsal (Teolinda, 1925, or Smerch, 1927), and see few 
performances or none at all, given the potentially controversial content they were unwittingly 
generating by directly addressing Soviet themes.
The risks involved were unknown for all parties, but there is no question of the sincerity of 
the solutions the artists were seeking. They were political first, with a focus on scenarios that 
would tell the right story about the emergent New Society. In other words, they were seeking 
to convince Lenin and his successors of their value through the very aspects from which the 
contempt of ballet as culture was derived. This was, essentially, a type of cultural warfare 
between those making it and those with control of it. Whilst this solution more or less worked 
for art forms like film, the theatrical storytelling of ballet remained waiting for the validation of 
its efforts by the political and cultural elite. As long as it persisted in making claim to the 
stories of Soviet life, it appeared doomed to failure. Goliezovsky’s notion of the ‘dram-balet’ 
contained within it only an insurmountable challenge to those who would not grant ballet the 
same capacity as film or opera to spell out stories sufficiently didactically in order to be 
unambiguous.
Of course, this was approaching the problem from the wrong direction. This is not to justify 
the abominable treatment of a generation of dancers and choreographers, but to understand 
what was ultimately necessary for ballet to become the cultural face of the Soviet Union. As 
indicated above, Lenin’s contempt for it as an art form was surely its superficiality and 
theatricality. These could hardly have created or reflected the serious cast of mind required 
of the Soviet citizen engaging with culture. The ballet community, by misreading the 
problem, was retaining what was for the Soviet cultural authorities the worst component of 
the art form, that the stylisation of ballet as drama required the incredulous, and this wouldn’t 
wash in explaining the regime to the public. What was required was to shift in another 
direction entirely.
As the cultural policy guru John Pick (1981) observed in a visit to the Soviet Union in the 
seventies, the art forms that tended to be favoured by the Soviet regime were inclined to be 
ones without ascribable meaning. Practices like circus, classical music or ballet were 
ultimately popular with ministers of culture precisely because of the absence of 
correspondence between action, experience of them and specific analogues of thought. This 
insight partly explains the shortcomings of the early Soviet period, where the performance of 
ballet itself was treated as secondary to the demands of the storytelling. It was the 
storytelling itself that contained the danger, and this is also clear from the critical 
assessments of the Soviet censors. Even the otherwise obsequious Tikhomirov, later to 
become the Bolshoi director, was nearly fired for The Red Poppy (1927), a mawkish, 
sentimental ballet about the oppression of Chinese peasants (it was revived for an unlikely 
visit to the Bolshoi of Mao Tse Dong in 1950).
Whilst there is plenty of support for the idea that after the early 1930s and the abandonment 
of didactic Soviet themes ballet in Russia avoided the political issues of culture by reverting 
to a traditional repertoire, and this must at least be partly true, I want to offer up an 
alternative explanation, linked to the examples I have offered at the beginning of this essay. 
Cultural practice in Tsarist times required an elite (and moneyed) audience. It also produced 
a disproportionate number of artists in many fields for a nation assumed in the West to be 
culturally backward, including the export of some of its treasures to Paris, Berlin, London and 
the rest. The structure of Russian society before the Revolution brought forth brilliant 
novelists and uncompromising visual artists (Marks, 2003), as well as an art form called 
Russian Ballet and composers that were hugely influential in the West. This was as much to 
do with an environment where the elite level of society was seeking distance between it and 
the source of its wealth (generally, the labour of peasants), though the work that emerged 
was not short of cross-referencing that world, as anyone familiar with Tchaikovsky’s 
borrowings of folk song, Malevich’s representations of peasant life or Tolstoy’s descriptions 
of their labour can attest. The arts became a high-culture prism used to express something 
of a society preoccupied with its notion of backwardness and yearning for cultural respect. 
This was not uncontroversial, but also not unnoticed by those seeking to remake that 
society. The arts had the power to persuade. This might make them dangerous or useful or 
even both. The ballet of the Imperial Theatres was organised to reinforce the legitimacy of 
the Tsar (and the late nineteenth century repertoire is littered with examples of this), and to 
do so in a way little different to the symbolism and metaphorical ballets of the French court of 
the early eighteenth century. The Bolsheviks could surely only fear the implications of their 
own representation on the ballet stage in contrast. It could only be inconsistent with a notion 
of equality and of the creation of the worker’s state, or portray them without the poise and 
glamour of their predecessors.
The solution is often dismissed in the West as a cop-out, but it ought to be taken much more 
seriously than that. Ballet began to reflect to its audiences a key Soviet value: hard, physical 
work undertaken on behalf of others. Its presentation went well beyond the Tsarist notion of 
pretty femininity represented by Kschesskinskaya and her voluptuous sensuality and 
towards the dancer as cultural worker. The codes and techniques of ballet suppressed the 
potential of eroticism, however scantily clad the dancers may have been. They were offered 
less as sexual objects as models of physical perfection possible only through the Soviet 
system. The closed, smoothed and perfected form of the body that Bakhtin (1984) would 
theorise as its evolution saw its apotheosis in the white leotards, long legs and pink tights of 
the dancers in Les Sylphides or Swan Lake ahead of dramatic portrayals of difficult to 
communicate narratives. It was technical capacity that trumped other aspects of the 
presentation of the Soviet body, affirming as it did the rightness of a system that could 
produce such seemingly effortless perfection. By concentrating on the technical abilities of 
their artists, investing in their physicality and turning their energies in this direction, rather 
than abstract notions about creative expression, the Soviet Union found a new means of 
presenting itself in cultural form. In a conflict between symbolic concept and practical 
manifestation, it was the practice that triumphed. 
Most curiously, the exploration of this aspect of Soviet ballet has often attracted scorn. For 
many, it represented the withering of Russian ballet traditions into the safety of practical 
mastery. This assumes that ballet ought to have been driven by the same exigencies 
wherever it was practiced, though it is also quite possible to identify the issues I have 
discussed in the work of George Balanchine, so not quite so far removed as all that from 
wider trends. What is more interesting here is not the shift away from story telling (these 
were only ever an excuse for staging divertissement in any case). It is the recasting of the 
work of ballet, seeing it as consistent with the demands on everyone to commit their labour 
to the glory of the state. That this appears to have reduced the political heat around ballet is 
obvious, but in this interpretation, it is the clumsy, ham-fisted attempts at overt political 
statement that look like the exception. The emphasis on technical excellence became, 
effectively, the only way forward for Russian ballet, the energy of the dancers finding 
acceptable expression in physical capacity.  This was certainly a form of freedom, and there 
is no credible way of suggesting the Bolshoi or any other Russian ballet company, as 
harbouring a fifth column because of it.  In fact, as recorded in the minutes of any number of 
meetings of the company during Soviet times, dancers and artistic staff were strong 
supporters of the state that had offered them patronage, and were concerned to make 
international tours, for example, a success as Soviet exports. More obviously, it was the 
means of creating apolitical space, an uncontroversial opportunity to excel without 
compromise whilst remaining true to the spirit of the nation that appears to have inspired 
them. More than that, it was through this exemplification of Soviet possibility that ballet grew 
to be the definitive cultural form of the USSR. All the way to the end of the regime, they still 
showed Swan Lake on television in advance of a major announcement or the death of a 
leader. This only happens if everyone understands the significance of this form of labour as 
exceptional.
This changes to a great extent our perception of what ballet might mean in the context of the 
Soviet Union, but also stands as a rebuke to those who believe the validation of cultural 
practice trumps the practice itself. The mastery of technique, it appears, was the very route 
to the freedom to express for the Soviet citizen. The Soviet dancer took part in their labour 
with no less vigour than expected of other citizens, Stakhanovites every one, and whilst their 
physical exertions may have been of exceptional finesse, they were still obviously, almost 
ostentatiously, hard; physical rather than erotic and disciplined rather than spontaneous. 
Ballet was far better at reflecting a political reality than shaping one.
The significance of this ought not to be elided in the efforts to colour the Soviet Union as 
dominated by an uncreative bureaucracy imposing its will on artists to the detriment of their 
development. The priorities of Soviet ballet were not the glory of choreographers (a group 
that clearly suffered if they flirted with Soviet themes), but the performances of dancers in 
their demonstration of Soviet values. Those values (and those dancers) reflected a desire to 
reward merit in the technical sense. The preoccupation with dragging what the new leaders 
believed to be a backward country into technological future was played out in all areas of 
Soviet life. The work of dancer was hardly different, and there is plenty of consensus about 
the huge improvements in technique that emerged from Soviet times. To miss the 
significance of this by locating its cause in a fear of creativity or recriminations about 
creativity could only be partly true. When Stalin described artists as ‘engineers of human 
souls’, his metaphor was only partial, reflecting a Soviet fixation on the practical value of 
engineering to the development of the new society.
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